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REFERRING TO, BELIEVING IN,
AND WORSHIPPING THE SAME GOD:
A REFORMED VIEW
Jeroen de Ridder and René van Woudenberg

We present a Reformed view on the relation between Christianity and nonChristian religions. We then explore what this view entails for the question
whether Christians and non-Christian religious believers refer to, believe in,
and worship the same God. We first analyze the concepts of worship, beliefin, and reference, as well as their interrelations. We then argue that adherents
of the Abrahamic religions plausibly refer to the same God, whereas adherents of non-Abrahamic religions do not refer to this God. Nonetheless, it
would be wrong to say that adherents of all Abrahamic religions believe in
and worship the same God.

This paper addresses the question what a Reformed account of the relation between Christian and non-Christian religions entails for the question
whether Christians and non-Christian believers refer to, believe in, and
worship the same God. The Reformed account in question can be found in
the writings of the Dutch theologians Abraham Kuyper, Herman Bavinck,
Johan Herman Bavinck, and Johannes Verkuyl, all of whom were inspired
by John Calvin.1
1. A Reformed View on the Relation between
Christianity and Non-Christian Religions
In this section we present the Reformed view of the relation between
Christianity and non-Christian religions in the form of several theses and
provide explanatory commentary. We don’t provide anything like a fullblown justification or defense of any of these theses. For that we refer to

1
Abraham Kuyper, Encyclopedia of Sacred Theology (New York: Scribner’s, 1898); Herman
Bavinck, Philosophy of Revelation (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1909). Johan Herman
Bavinck, Christus en de mystiek van het Oosten [Christ and Eastern Mysticism] (Kampen: Kok,
1934); “Religious Consciousness and the Christian Faith,” in The J. H. Bavinck Reader, ed.
James D. Bratt, John Bolt, and Paul J. Visser (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2013), 145–301;
and Introduction to the Science of Missions (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1960); Johannes
Verkuyl, Contemporary Missiology (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1988).
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the works of the neo-Calvinist theologians mentioned.2 The first thesis,
which we call the General Revelation Thesis, is that
(A) God reveals himself to all humans at all times and all places.
Underlying this thesis is what St. Paul writes in the first chapter of his
letter to the Christians in Rome, and what he said in his famous speech on
Mars Hill as related in Acts 17. The thesis says that God reveals himself—
by which is meant that God manifests himself, makes himself known, or,
as J. H. Bavinck used to say, that God “communicates with” or “speaks
to” humans. Furthermore, God reveals himself to all humans at all times
and at all places: No human being has ever been anywhere without God
revealing himself to him or her. God’s revelation is not limited to certain
people, places, or times, but is truly general.
This being said, two interrelated questions arise. First, how, in what
manner, by what means, does this divine revelation take place. And
second, what is its content? As to the first question, the Reformed view
endorses that God reveals himself to all human beings in at least two
different ways—through the works of nature that present themselves to
the human senses, and through human conscience (cf. The Belgic Confession, Article 2). As to the second question, the Reformed view is that what
God reveals of himself is, as St. Paul says, “his eternal power and divine
majesty” (Romans 1:20) as well as his laws, of which moral laws form
an important part. The guiding idea is that when humans observe and
inspect the cosmos, either with the naked eye, or through telescope and
microscope, they are in effect facing the manifestations of divine majesty,
effects of divine activity, instantiations of God’s power. And when humans
reflect on what they ought and ought not to do, on what is good and what
is bad, on what is valuable and what is not, they will, when all goes well,3
think thoughts that are in effect divine revelations of God’s will.
The first thesis, then, is that God reveals himself or his characteristics—
his power and majesty and his will—to each and every human being,
through nature as well as through conscience. In the Reformed tradition
this revelation is named both “general revelation” and “creational revelation.” The first name indicates the address of the revelation (all humans),
the second the means of the revelation (nature and conscience).
The first thesis is about what God does. The second thesis, the Response
Thesis, is a thesis about what humans do:
(B) Human religions (or similarly encompassing worldviews) are responses to God’s general or creational revelation.
2
We also note that our presentation of the view differs markedly from the presentation
of the Dutch theologians themselves—a difference that is, at least in part, due to the fact
that we are analytically trained philosophers, whereas they were hermeneutically trained
theologians.
3
This qualification is needed in order to accommodate the Reformed view’s notion that,
due to sin, the human cognitive capacities are impaired (although they are not rendered
completely unreliable).
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Buddhism, Hinduism, the Greek and Ancient religions, animism, and so
forth, this thesis says, are in one way or another responses to God’s general revelation (which is not to deny that they can also be responses to or
expressions of things other than God’s general revelation, such as cultural
phenomena, lust for power, etc.). If we think of God’s revealing himself
to humans as God’s “speaking” non-literally to us, then we can think of
the world’s religions as answers or responses to revelation. Humans are,
in an astonishing variety of ways, responding to what is in fact God’s
power, God’s majesty, as well as to what are in fact God’s commands. In
the world’s religions these responses have been systematized and cast in
the form of communal images, fixed rituals, and explicit creeds. But even
in those systematized and communal forms, the diversity of the world’s
religions betokens the diversity of responses to God’s revelation.
Often those who respond explicitly conceive of what they do as responding to God, but that isn’t necessary. They may conceive of their
responses as something other than responses to divine revelation—they
may not even conceive of them as responses in the first place. This is important to note because of the ubiquitous presence (at least in our part of
the world) of secular, non-religious people, who by their own lights are
doing anything but responding to God’s revelation. The Reformed view
on this can be brought out by an analogy. If you walk through a shopping
mall where Bruckner’s ninth symphony plays through the speakers and
you have never heard of Bruckner and aren’t familiar with symphonies,
then the following applies to you: You are hearing Bruckner’s ninth symphony, but you don’t know that what you are hearing is Bruckner’s ninth,
nor that it is a symphony.4 Analogously, on the Reformed view, people can
be in the following situation: They are perceiving, and even responding
to, a revelation of God, but they don’t know that what they are perceiving
and responding to is a divine revelation. For example, one may decide
to speak the truth because one’s conscience tells one to do so, thus responding to God’s call made through one’s conscience, without realizing
that it is God’s call one is responding to.
To this the Reformed view adds a third thesis, the Inadequate Response
Thesis:
(C) Unaided human responses to God’s general or creational revelation, such as those systematized in religions and worldviews, are
sub-standard and inadequate.
This thesis holds that all unaided human responses to God’s general revelation are a special case of the much wider phenomenon of inadequate
reactions. We know that humans, generally speaking, react inadequately
to each other. One can be invited, but fail to respond. One can be treated
kindly, yet respond ungraciously. One can be told important facts that
4
Situations of this sort are analyzed in Fred Dretske, Seeing and Knowing (London: Routledge, 1970).
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one fails to believe. Responses to our fellows can fail in various dimensions. Likewise human responses to God or to God’s revelation can be
inadequate behaviorally, morally, and doxastically. And as St. Paul says,
this possibility is widely realized:
For although they knew God, they neither glorified him as God nor gave
thanks to him, but their thinking became futile and their foolish hearts were
darkened. Although they claimed to be wise, they became fools and exchanged the glory of the immortal God for images made to look like mortal
man and birds and animals and reptiles. (Romans 1:21–22)

Worshipping animals, the apostle affirms, is an inadequate response to
God’s general revelation, whereas an adequate response would be to
honor and thank God, to devote one’s life to him, to do what He requires
us to do. The Reformed view is that inadequate responses to God’s revelations are due to, and instances of, human sinfulness.
J. H. Bavinck (1949) analyzes such inadequate responses in terms of
“pushing away” and “substituting.” Inadequate responses to God’s revelation are responses in which the true God is pushed away and replaced
by an idol. Bavinck also compares this process with what happens when
we are dreaming. Sometimes actually existing phenomena figure in our
dreams, such as sounds, people, rocks, and examinations. But these phenomena are strangely malformed, enlarged, or intensified in our dreamt
reality. The sound of a running faucet can enter our dreams as that of a
roaring waterfall and the soft humming of distant traffic might appear as
the threatening thundering of an approaching avalanche. The true nature
of the phenomena is hardly recognizable in our dreams. Something similar
is going on in human responses to God’s revelation: These responses are
hardly recognizable as concerning the true God who is revealing himself,
even though they are still responses to him. That is why, as (C) has it, these
responses are inadequate and sub-standard, if unaided by some special
divine provision.
A further part of the Reformed view is the Special Revelation Thesis,
which says that
(D) God reveals himself specially, i.e., at specific historical times and
geographical places, to and through specific persons and peoples.
Whereas thesis (A) endorses that God reveals himself generally, i.e., to all
people always and everywhere, (D) endorses that God also reveals himself
specially. Examples of this are those high moments that jointly constitute
salvation history: God’s issuing of the Ten Commandments to Moses on
Mount Sinai, God’s calling of the great prophets Isaiah, Jeremiah, and
Ezekiel, Christ’s virgin birth, Christ’s ministry and miracles, Christ’s crucifixion, death and subsequent glorious resurrection from the dead.
Special revelation is “special” in the sense that it is God’s revelation at
specific historical times, at specific geographical places, to and through
specific persons. But although it is “special” in this sense, it is at the same
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time “general” in its intended audience. According to Christianity there
has been a substantial body of special revelation.
Given that God reveals himself in the ways indicated in theses (A) and
(D), the Reformed view endorses the following thesis about the nature of
the Christian faith:
(E) Christian faith is the appropriate response to both God’s general
revelation and the totality of God’s special revelation.
This thesis indicates that religious belief should now, i.e., in the current
phase of world history, meet a normative standard of appropriateness if
it is to be Christian faith. Christian faith (or better: proper Christian faith)
meets this standard, whereas other religious belief systems do not—or
not to the extent that Christian faith does. If someone has been exposed,
through the testimony of others, to the high points of Salvation history and
subsequently turns away from Christianity, or starts to believe that there
is no God, or believes that God exists but not that God was incarnated in
Christ, etc., then that person does respond to God’s revelation, but the
response doesn’t qualify as Christian faith, for the obvious reason that
the relevant standard of appropriateness has not been met. Throughout
church history there has been, and still is, discussion about what that
standard exactly amounts to. But traditional Christianity, also traditional
Reformed Christianity, has it that the standard is in effect formulated—at
least in part—in the main ecumenical Christian creeds.
On the Reformed view, then, there are two modes of revelation—general and special. They are similar in that both are revelations from the same
God; both ultimately (if not always directly) address all of humanity; and
both inevitably evoke human responses. They are dissimilar in that the
former is ubiquitous—it comes to us through conditions that are present
at all times and places—whereas the latter is spatiotemporally limited—it
comes to us through historical events at special times and places and then
through the testimony of others about those events.
To this it must be added that the former is geared towards a cognitive
faculty that forms specifically religious beliefs, whereas the latter is geared
towards our general cognitive faculties. This requires some elucidation.
On the Reformed view human beings have a specific indigenous cognitive
capacity to appreciate (at least some of) the contents of God’s general revelation. This capacity is held to be on a par with perception, memory, and
the faculty of reasoning, which are also indigenous cognitive capacities.
This capacity has sometimes been referred to as the sensus divinitatis.5 This
capacity is operative in the formation of such beliefs as that God exists, that
He is the creator of all things, that He is deserving of our adoration, that
He disapproves of what is bad, and the like. Had this capacity not been
marred, hemmed, suppressed, and impeded by sin, these beliefs would
be as ubiquitous and universally agreed upon as are beliefs formed in
See Alvin Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).
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response to perception, or such beliefs as that every number that is greater
than 5 is also greater than 3. General revelation is thus geared towards
a specific cognitive capacity that humans are endowed with (“specific”
here indicating that the capacity engenders specifically religious beliefs).
Special revelation, by contrast, is geared towards our general cognitive
capacities, viz. the capacities of seeing and hearing, as well as the capacity
of receiving and believing testimony (“general” here indicating that the
capacities engender not only specifically religious beliefs). God’s special
revelation on Mount Sinai, where He gave Moses the Ten Commandments, was what Moses heard and saw—and the Israelites and all those
who subsequently got to know the Commandments did so because they
accepted testimony to the effect that God gave Moses the Ten Commandments. But hearing, seeing and accepting testimony doesn’t only evince
specifically religious beliefs.
There is a further thesis that is part and parcel of the Reformed view.
Theses (A) and (B) already presuppose it, but it is useful to state it separately too. It is the familiar thesis of monotheism, the claim that
(F) There is, ontologically speaking, only one God.
This brings us to a final thesis that belongs to the Reformed view:
(G) Worshipping anything other than the one true God is idolatry.
Assuming that neither Zeus, nor Astarte, nor the Sun-god exist, (G) declares worship of Zeus, Astarte, and the Sun to be idolatry.
This ends our presentation of the Reformed view. We will now discuss what the Reformed view entails with respect to the question whether
Christians and non-Christian religious believers worship, believe in, and
refer to the same God. In order to do so properly, we begin by analyzing
the relations between worship, belief, and reference.
2. Worship, Belief, and Reference
Worship, belief, and reference are not the same thing, and their interrelations are complex, as we will show.
2.1 Worship
To worship a god, or God, is to participate in certain individual or collective
practices. These practices consist in performing certain actions and activities that are regulated by more or less official rules about time, location,
roles and numbers of people, and can involve the handling of objects, the
singing of songs, the recitation of words, or periods of intentional silence.
In addition, worship can include or perhaps require attitudes like adoration, awe, or delight.
Worship, furthermore, has an object: to worship is to worship someone
(or, in some cases, something, or several persons or things). One worships
because the object of worship is believed to be worthy of worship and
because one deems the worship practice in question an appropriate one,
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or because one is part of a tradition in which the practice has been deemed
to be so.
Worship involves additional beliefs as well. For instance, participation
in the Christian Eucharist is an act of worship that involves or requires,
on the part of the participants, not only the belief that God is worthy of
worship, but also the belief that Christ died on the cross for the sins of
the world, and that his death brought atonement and newness of life, as
well as still further beliefs, for example that Christ is the son of God, the
second person of the Trinity. Without these beliefs, Eucharistic worship
wouldn’t make sense. Analogous things hold for other forms of religious
worship.
At this juncture a question may arise. Isn’t it possible to participate in
worship without (much) explicit belief? Small children, for instance, participate in some elements of Christian worship without having much by
way of explicit Christian belief. In response, a distinction must be made
between proper worship and “going through the motions.” Two people
can display all the same outward signs of participating in worship, while
only one of them is actually worshipping, whereas the other merely goes
through the motions. The relevant difference may be caused by their respective beliefs but also by their respective attitudes. If someone displays
worshipping behavior but doesn’t believe that the object of worship exists,
or doesn’t have the right sort of attitudes, she isn’t worshipping properly.
What she is engaged in, at best, is a degenerated form of worship. It is no
doubt hard to say—and highly controversial—which beliefs and attitudes
are required for proper worship, but a minimum seems to be belief in the
existence and worthiness of the object of worship, as well as some degree
of reverence.6 This minimal requirement is something children can and
typically will meet.
In sum, then, worship is participation in an individual or collective
practice that minimally requires belief in the existence and worthiness of
the object of worship, as well as certain attitudes of reverence towards the
object of worship.
2.2 Belief
Next, what is belief? As we will be thinking of it, it is first and foremost
a propositional attitude. That Christ is the Son of God, the second person of
the Trinity, is something that Christians believe. What they believe is a
proposition, viz. the proposition that is expressed by the italicized words.
Believing proposition p, we hold furthermore, is believing that p is true.
How does belief as a propositional attitude (belief-that) relate to “belief in”? Christians believe in God, and it is possible to believe in fairies,
fate, astrology, or homeopathy. Although believing in these things may
6
But perhaps even full belief is asking too much. Maybe acceptance or hoping-to-be-true
could also be sufficient. Perhaps worship on the basis of such weaker attitudes is sub-standard in some respects, but at the same time it definitely seems better than merely going
through the motions.
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involve various things such as (positive) emotional attitudes, dispositions
to act, etc., it also requires that one holds certain propositions to be true.
Minimally, to believe in X is to believe (a) that X exists, i.e., that X is a real
person or thing, as opposed to an illusion or a creature of fiction, (b) that
X is a certain kind of thing, i.e., that some characterization of X’s basic
nature is correct, and (c) that X can be trusted or relied upon in those
matters that are relevant to things with X’s presumed nature. To believe in
homeopathy, for example, is to believe (a) that there exist certain actually
operative (b) physical processes (c) that can be relied upon to cure people.
When Christians believe in God, they believe (a) that He exists, (b) that He
is (at least) a personal being and (c) that He can be trusted to do certain
things. Clearly, there are logical relations between these beliefs: (b) and
(c) presuppose (a), but not the other way around. (For it seems possible to
believe that X exists while remaining entirely noncommittal about what
X is or does.7) Beliefs of type (b) and (c) mutually constrain each other:
To believe that something can be trusted in certain ways is minimally to
believe that it is a thing with the powers to do whatever it is trusted to
do. And, vice versa, to believe that something is a certain kind of thing
imposes constraints on what it can be trusted to do.
Perhaps someone will worry that we have construed belief-in overly
intellectualistically by including propositional beliefs of type (b) and (c)
in our analysis. Many people, it may be argued, believe in God without
holding much by way of specific beliefs about what He is like or what He
can be trusted to do—and there is nothing wrong with that. In response,
we should emphasize that the beliefs of type (b) and (c) we have in mind
can be fairly unspecific and simple, and need not involve any sophisticated doctrine. It is also possible for individuals to defer to a (communal)
authority for the specific content of (b) and (c), which is perhaps particularly relevant in the case of religious beliefs. Nonetheless, we think it is
impossible to believe in X without believing anything whatsoever about
the kind of thing X is and what X is supposed to do. What could it mean
for someone to believe in God yet believe nothing whatsoever about who
He is or what He does—e.g., not even that He is a personal being or that
He wants to save human beings? Even apophatically minded believers
countenance beliefs about what God is not. Belief in X, then, comes with
a minimum of descriptive content about X. (Which is not to deny that,
for some people, it involves richer descriptive content. For an orthodox
Christian, for instance, to affirm her belief in God may well be shorthand
for an affirmation of the ecumenical creeds.)
In the previous section we argued that worship of X minimally requires
belief that X exists and is worthy of worship. We can now say that worship
of X minimally requires belief in X as analyzed above.8 The link between
Note that such an attitude would thus fail to qualify as belief-in on our analysis.
Assuming that X’s being worthy of worship at least requires that X can be relied upon in
the relevant respects.
7
8
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worship and belief-in gives us a possible handle on the idea that worship might be inadequate. If people worship X and hence believe in X, but
X doesn’t exist or has fundamentally different characteristics from what
people assume, then their worship is (unbeknownst to them) misguided.
Presumably, it is too demanding to require that proper worship must include all and only true beliefs about the object of worship, but if people’s
beliefs of types (b) and (c) are widely off the mark, their worship is misguided and may be a form of idolatry.
2.3 Reference
On to reference. True belief about something involves reference to that
thing in the sense that for someone to have a de re belief (so, a belief about
that thing), she must have in mind the thing that the belief is about. Your
true belief that the earth has one moon, for example, involves reference to
the earth in the sense that in order for you to have this belief (about the
earth) you need to have the moon in mind. False belief, too, may involve
reference. Had you believed that the earth has two moons, your false belief would still involve reference to the earth (in the sense explained). It
is somewhat less clear that it would involve reference to the only moon
that the earth does have, but presumably it does. In what follows we will
avail ourselves of the locution “this belief involves a reference to X,” or
even “this belief refers to X.” We use them because they make for easier
formulations; but they should be understood in the way just explained.
Furthermore, we also say that terms refer; this is an abbreviated way of
saying that we use terms to refer to something—referring is something we
do by using words.
There is an interesting interplay between reference and belief-in when
we consider creatures of fiction such as Hamlet or Frodo Baggins. We can
have true or false beliefs about them, depending on how well we know the
stories in which they figure. When we believe that Hamlet lived in Denmark, we do seem to refer to a particular person, except, of course, that
there is no person in the actual world available for our “reference” to latch
onto. Depending on one’s preferred account of the nature of creatures of
fiction, one may hold that “Hamlet” either refers to an abstract object,9 a
merely possible creature,10 or a non-existent object.11 At any rate, it isn’t a
case of straightforward reference. Let’s call reference of this kind fictional
reference so as to distinguish it from reference simpliciter, which is always
to actually existing persons or objects. Henceforth, we will use “reference”
to stand for reference simpliciter. If an expression neither refers nor refers
9
John R. Searle, “The Logical Status of Fictional Discourse,” New Literary History 6 (1975),
319–332; Peter van Inwagen, “Creatures of Fiction,” American Philosophical Quarterly 14
(1977), 299–308; Amie Thomasson, Fiction and Metaphysics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
10
David Lewis, “Truth in Fiction,” American Philosophical Quarterly 15 (1978), 37–46.
11
A. Meinong, “On the Theory of Objects,” in Realism and the Background of Phenomenology,
ed. Roderick Chisholm (Atascadero: Ridgeview, 1960 [1904]).
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fictionally but still seems to refer or was intended to do so, then we have
a case of failed reference.12 Although fictional reference is possible, belief in
creatures of fiction is mistaken. As we saw above, belief in X entails a commitment to the belief that X actually exists and such a belief is false if X is
a creature of fiction.
With the above analyses of belief-in and sorts of reference in hand, the
following permutations are possible. (i) Belief in X with reference: This is
the scenario that most religious believers hold to be actual for their own
case. (ii) Belief in X with fictional reference: This is the case when someone
believes in, say, the god Astarte, while Astarte (unbeknownst to the believer) in fact does not exist, but is a character in an elaborate mythology
or other piece of fiction; that person’s belief refers fictionally to (the fictional god) Astarte. (iii) Belief in X with failed reference: This happens when
a person believes in a non-existing god who isn’t even a character in a
mythology or a more or less established piece of fiction.13 (iv) Reference
to X without belief in X: This happens when someone believes that whomever it is that kept him alive during his long and very serious illness, is
to be thanked. If it was in fact God who, perhaps by means of the doctors, nurses, and medication, has kept him alive, then his belief contains a
reference to God—unwittingly.14 It also happens when someone prays to
God to stop being an atheist, as Tim Mawson has recently argued some
atheists ought to.15 (v) Fictional reference without belief in X: This is the case,
for instance, when modern westerners talk about the god Astarte, whom
they correctly believe to be a fictional god. Although irrelevant for present
purposes, we mention the final option for the sake of completeness: (vi)
Failed reference without belief in X. This occurs when someone uses a non-

12
An issue arises here about how to delimit creatures of fiction from non-referring expressions. The expression “the king of France” in the sentence “The king of France is bald”
doesn’t refer. But if we take that sentence as a tiny piece of fiction, you might go on to say
that “the king of France” refers to a fictional character. Even weirder, we can make up stories
about impossible objects: The square circle sat down with the third even prime number to
discuss how they had made themselves impossible. Should we then say that “square circle”
refers to a creature of fiction? Both of these moves seem wrong. Let’s say that reference to a
creature of fiction at least requires that there is a contextually salient piece of fiction available
in which this creature figures. This might range from well-known stories to little narratives
that are made up on the spot.
13
Could the notorious Flying Spaghetti Monster be a case in point (assuming someone
were to believe in it)? Perhaps so, especially when it was first introduced. By now, however,
it seems that the thing has acquired a more or less established narrative in which it belongs,
including its own webpage (www.venganza.org) and Wikipedia entry (http://en.wikipedia
.org/wiki/Flying_Spaghetti_Monster).
14
This is just an instance of the general phenomenon that an expression can refer to a
particular person or object without the person using the expression having beliefs about who
or what he has uniquely referred to by means of the expression he uses. For example, “the
fifteenth President of the U.S.” uniquely refers to a person, even if the user of that expression
doesn’t know the name or anything else of the fifteenth President of the U.S.
15
Timothy J. Mawson, “Praying to Stop Being an Atheist,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 67 (2010), 173–186.
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referring expression that purports to refer to X, while being aware that X
doesn’t exist.16
Reference to X requires the existence of X, we said. But more is needed.
Two different theories aim to explain what more. One preliminary point
before we briefly recount these two theories: We will be treating “God”
as a proper name for the divine being. Doing so is an assumption that
meshes well with the three Abrahamic religions. Yet we should point out
that there is also a venerable philosophical tradition that takes “god” as
a common noun (a sortal concept) that refers to a class of objects (with
only one member, according to monotheists). Anselmian perfect being
theology is most naturally construed as doing this. Depending on one’s
account of reference for common nouns, this may lead to results that differ
from the results one gets when one treats “God” as a proper name.
The descriptivist theory of reference was long taken as the obvious and
commonsensical position.17 According to it, a proper name like “Shakespeare” refers when its user associates a description with that name that
uniquely picks out Shakespeare from among everything else.
Failure of reference, on the descriptivist view, can occur in various ways.
First, the description associated with a name fails to identify someone
uniquely; it holds true for more than one person. In this case reference is
ambiguous and hence unsuccessful. Second, the description is satisfied by
no person, in which case the name is empty in that it doesn’t latch onto
anyone. Third, the name is associated with a true description, but of the
wrong person.
The classical descriptivist theory of reference faces a number of problems. For the purposes of this paper we highlight just one. We often have
more than one uniquely identifying description of a person at our disposal.
Which of them is associated with the person’s name? Is one description
more central than others? If so, which one, and who or what determines
this? These are difficult if not unanswerable questions. Therefore, instead
of holding that a speaker associates one uniquely identifying description
with a name, it has been proposed that she typically associates a cluster of
descriptions with a name.18 This view, too, raises difficult questions. Must
every description in the cluster be a uniquely identifying description or
16
We say this option is irrelevant here because even convinced atheists will have to admit
that God figures in culturally salient pieces of fiction—fiction from the atheist’s point of view,
that is. So expressions for God minimally refer in the fictional sense (cf. for this Jonathan
Schaffer, “On What Grounds What,” in Metametaphysics, ed. David Chalmers, David Manley,
and Ryan Wasserman [New York: Oxford University Press, 2009], 359). Note that it wouldn’t
even help the atheist if she had a compelling argument to the effect that a concept of God was
inconsistent, for there can be stories about impossible objects and persons as well.
17
Although it originates with John Stuart Mill, its canonical modern formulation is to
be found in Gottlob Frege, “On Sense and Reference,” in Translations from the Philosophical
Writings of Gottlob Frege, ed. Peter Geach and Max Black (Oxford: Blackwell, 1952 [1892]),
57–58, and Bertrand Russell, “Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description,”
in Mysticism and Logic (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1957 [1917]).
18
See John R. Searle, “Proper Names,” Mind 67 (1958), 166–173 and Peter Strawson, Individuals (London: Methuen, 1959), 180–183, 190–194.
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can the cluster also include some non-uniquely identifying descriptions?
Are all the descriptions equally important or do some carry more weight
than others? And who or what determines this? Can the cluster contain
false descriptions? At what point does the presence of false descriptions
make reference unsuccessful? Our present goal is not to look for answers
to these questions, but simply to point them out, as they will become
important later on when we investigate whether Christians and other religious believers refer to the same God.
On the descriptivist theory, then, descriptions play an intermediary
role between the name and the referent. Because a speaker possesses
a uniquely identifying description, she is able to fix the referent of the
name. The second theory of reference, the causal theory, cuts out this
“middle man.” Successful reference, on this theory, is grounded in causal
processes that establish an appropriate link between the referent and the
speaker.19 Proponents of the causal theory argue against descriptivism
that knowledge of identifying descriptions is neither necessary nor sufficient for successful reference. Unnecessary, because people can refer to
Aristotle, or Einstein, or other famous historical figures without knowing
anything that uniquely identifies them. Insufficient, because someone may
associate a uniquely identifying description with the wrong name, so that
the description is true of someone other than the bearer of the name. In
that case, causal theorists urge, reference is made to the bearer of the name
and not to the thing or person satisfying the description. So even when
someone associates “the Dutch prime minister in 1903” with the name
“Bob Dylan,” she has not referred to Abraham Kuyper when using the
name “Bob Dylan,” but to the singer of Blood on the Tracks.
The causal theory gives the following positive account of successful reference: for every name there has been an “initial baptism” or similar event
in which that name is given to someone. Typically this happens through
ostension: You point to someone and declare that, from now on, the person
shall be called, for example, “William Shakespeare.” It can also happen by
using a definite description: Someone may declare that “the baby with
the red socks in the left cradle” shall be called “Robert Zimmerman.” The
crucial point is that there is an instance of genuine cognitive contact—a
non-deviant causal link of an appropriate kind—between the referent and
the name-giver. This contact does not require the name-giver to have any
specific knowledge of the person referred to, let alone to have a uniquely
identifying description of her. It is even possible for the name-giver to
have mostly or only false beliefs about the referent.20 The name given in
the initial baptism can then be communicated to others in the community
and through history, so as to eventually be picked up by current speakers,
19
The loci classici for the causal theory are Saul Kripke, Naming and Necessity (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1980) and Keith Donnellan, “Proper Names and Identifying
Descriptions,” in Semantics of Natural Language, ed. Donald Davidson and Gilbert Harman
(Dordrecht: Reidel, 1972), 356–379.
20
Although we will later argue for an important qualification of this claim.
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who can then use it to refer to the person named in the initial baptism. So
it is because we are connected through a causal chain of communication
to the real person William Shakespeare that we can use the name “William
Shakespeare” to refer to him.
This basic version of the causal theory faces a problem. Suppose that, to
use an example inspired by William Alston, it wasn’t God but Satan whom
Abraham originally was in cognitive contact with when he believed that
it was God who spoke to him.21 Abraham baptized whomever he was in
contact with, with the name “God.” Of course, Abraham believed that
there is a God and let us furthermore assume that he also believed that
God is the creator of everything, benevolent, and trustworthy. On this
scenario, the causal theory has it that Abraham would really be referring
to Satan when using “God,” while holding massively false beliefs about
him (Satan being neither the creator of everything, nor benevolent and
trustworthy). Moreover, so would be all adherents of Judaism, Christians,
and Muslims. Pace Alston, we think this constitutes a reductio ad absurdum
of a purely causal theory of reference.
This is not to deny that friends of the causal theory may be right in
holding that massively false beliefs about X are sometimes compatible with
reference to X. But we do think that this example shows that the purely
causal requirements laid down by the causal theory are not sufficient for
reference. We think at least the following two amendments are necessary.
First, when someone who baptizes X is mistaken about X in fundamental
ways, i.e., about the very kind of thing X is, it is implausible that by baptizing X she has introduced a referring expression for X into the language.22
If someone sees a brownish rock from afar and says: “Let’s call that stray
dog Rocky,” she hasn’t thereby successfully baptized a rock “Rocky,” for
she has acted on the fundamentally mistaken belief that she was spotting a dog. So this is a case of failed reference. Similarly, in the Abraham
case, since Abraham was fundamentally mistaken about the kind of being
he was in cognitive contact with, his use of “God” fails to refer. In addition to the causal requirements, then, reference requires that a user of
the name not be fundamentally mistaken about what kind of thing she is
referring to. In other words, she must associate with the name a minimum
of correct descriptive content. Secondly, if someone associates (or comes
to associate) with “X” many specific beliefs that are false of X, but are in
fact true about Y, it seems plausible to hold that she is referring to Y rather
than X when using the name “X” (assuming that there are appropriate
chains of communication to both X and Y in the speaker’s community).
Rather than insisting that she refers to X, we should say she refers to Y but
has a false belief about Y’s name—namely, that it is “X” rather than “Y.”
21
William P. Alston, “Referring to God,” in Divine Nature and Human Language (Ithaca, NJ:
Cornell University Press, 1989), 103–117.
22
For this criticism, cf. Gareth Evans, “The Causal Theory of Names,” Proceedings of the
Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 47 (1973), 187–208.
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If someone is using “Albert Einstein” and it becomes apparent that the
beliefs she associates with this name are massively false about Einstein,
but all true of Nils Bohr, then her beliefs refer to Bohr, not to Einstein (assuming that there is the right kind of causal connection of that person and
her community to Bohr).23 Analogously, if Abraham’s beliefs are, in the
main, true of God but false of Satan, then it seems plausible that his use
of “God” refers to God, even if Abraham’s initial baptismal act mistakenly
named Satan “God.” We take this to show that a purely causal theory of
reference is inadequate and that modifications inspired by the descriptive
theory are required to handle problem cases.
2.4 Summary: The Relations between Worship, Belief, and Reference
When we take the results of the above discussion and apply them to the
central issues of the present paper, i.e., worship of, belief in, and reference
to god(s) or God, we can summarize our claims so far as follows:24
• (Proper) worship of God requires belief in God.
• Belief in God requires the beliefs (a) that God exists, (b) that God is a
certain kind of being, (c) that God is trustworthy.
• Belief in God involves (attempted) reference to God.
• Reference to God requires the existence of God.
• False beliefs about God may nonetheless refer to God.
• Belief in God that involves mostly or radically false beliefs about
God is misguided and leads to improper worship.
3. The Same God?
Worship of God, we said, requires belief in God. And there can be no adequate belief in God unless there is reference to God. And there can be no
reference to God, unless God exists. So let us first look at reference and

23
Note that saying this doesn’t commit us to anything implausible in Kripke’s famous
Gödel/Schmidt case (Kripke, Naming and Necessity, 83–84). In this case, Gödel stole the proof
of the incompleteness theorem from a man named Schmidt to pass it off as his own. People
now incorrectly associate “the man who discovered the incompleteness theorem” with
“Gödel.” In spite of this, Kripke urges, we think “Gödel” refers to Gödel and not to Schmidt.
Now, since we say that someone who associates many beliefs that are true of Y with the
name “X” refers to Y rather than X, it may look like we would have to reject the intuition
that Kripke unearths. This is not so, however, since it isn’t clear from the Gödel/Schmidt case
description that the person referring to Gödel holds many false beliefs about Gödel that are in
fact true of Schmidt. As far as the case goes, it’s just the one belief about Gödel’s proving the
incompleteness theorem. This, we think, makes a crucial difference. The more systematically
someone associates beliefs that are false about X but true about Y with the name “X,” the
more plausible it becomes to think that she simply refers to Y when she uses “X” but has a
false belief about Y’s name.
24
For the sake of brevity, we formulate them as claims about God, but they hold generally.
“God” can be substituted for (the names of) other gods.
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consider whether on the Reformed view Christians and non-Christians
refer to the same God when they (say they) believe in God.
3.1 Reference
What does the Reformed view entail with respect to reference to God?
One might think that, since the view maintains that there is only one
God (thesis (F)) who reveals himself generally (A) and since all humans
respond to this general revelation (B), the Reformed view entails that reference to God is shared throughout the world’s religions. After all, besides
God, there is simply nothing for anyone to refer to.
But things aren’t quite as easy as this. When applied to reference to
God, both theories of reference introduced above make trouble for the
above line of reasoning. According to the basic descriptivist theory, for a
speaker to refer to God, she must have associated with the name “God” a
description that is satisfied by God and God alone. For many believers it
will be easy to come up with several such descriptions, as God is unique
in many of his properties, e.g., “creator of heaven and earth,” “omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good,” or “righteous and merciful judge
of all people.” If adherents of Judaism, Christians and Muslims associate
these or other shared descriptions with the name of God, then, on the
basic descriptivist theory, they refer to the same God. But besides shared
descriptions, there are also many descriptions that Christians take to
be not only uniquely true of God but also of paramount importance to
their faith—descriptions, however, which are emphatically rejected by
Muslims and adherents of Judaism. For instance, that God is a Trinity
of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. If a Christian believer associates this
description with “God,” while a Muslim or Jew associates its denial (or
something obviously entailing its denial) with “God,” the descriptivist
theory entails that at most one of them is referring to God, since at most
one of them associates a correct uniquely identifying description with
“God.” Hence, on the basic descriptivist theory, whether adherents of
different religions refer to the same God turns out to vary on a case-bycase basis. If a Jew, Christian, and Muslim happen to associate a shared
uniquely identifying description with the name of God, they do. But
if they associate an unshared description with “God,” they don’t. This
is unsatisfactory on multiple counts. It is too arbitrary. Whether or not
Jews, Christians, and Muslims refer to the same God becomes a matter
of which description individuals associate with the name “God,” which
is surely a highly contingent fact. Next, it fails to take any account of
the Reformed view’s claim that religious beliefs are always (perhaps in
addition to other things) responses to God’s general revelation (theses
(A) and (B)). Although these theses do not entail guaranteed coreference
all by themselves, they do put pressure on an account of reference to
explain why responding to revelation from the same God does not lead
to coreference to that same God. Finally, given the historical ties between
the Abrahamic faiths, it is independently implausible that only some
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Jews, Christians, and Muslims would be referring to the same God, while
others aren’t.25
The cluster version of the descriptivist theory falls prey to the same
sort of worries. On the version that makes all descriptions in a cluster of
identifying descriptions equally important, it becomes vague whether
there is reference to the same God. Since some descriptions will be shared
and others will not, the question whether there is coreference doesn’t appear to have an answer. On the version that makes some descriptions in
the cluster more important than others, adherents of different religious
traditions almost certainly do not refer to the same God, since the reason
why religions are different in the first place is because they have partly
incompatible conceptions of God. As we said above, Christians will think
it crucially important that God is a trinity, while Muslims and Jews are
bound to emphasize that God is one in every respect (which they will
take to entail that He is not a trinity). The same worries as on the basic
descriptivist theory apply.
The upshot so far is twofold: (1) If reference is construed along descriptivist lines, the Reformed view does not straightforwardly imply that all
religious believers refer to the same God. (2) The Reformed view doesn’t
sit well with descriptivism, as descriptivism lacks the resources to take
account of the claim that people’s religious beliefs are always some sort
of response to general revelation from the same God and of the historical
connections between the Abrahamic faiths.
What about the causal theory? It says that if “God” is to refer, there
must have been an initial baptizing event in which someone was in genuine cognitive contact with God and named God “God.” This name must
then have been handed down through the ages by a (causal) communication chain, ensuring that later users of the name “God” still refer to God.
By understanding reference foremost in terms of causal connections
between referent and speaker(s), the causal theory can easily incorporate
the historical connections between the Abrahamic religions. Since the uses
of “God” in these three religions supposedly all trace back to Abraham’s
baptismal act—albeit through communication chains that have diverged—
there is shared reference to God. Adherents of historically unconnected
religions, such as Hinduism or Buddhism, in so far as they use the name
“God,” would not be referring to the same God.
Other elements of the Reformed view, however, complicate this tidy
picture. A natural way to understand the thesis of general revelation is

25
A further worry is that the descriptivist theory construes reference too individualistically, by requiring that every individual speaker possess her own uniquely identifying
description. We’re inclined to think, however, that this defect could be remedied fairly easily
by insisting that a (religious) community or communal authority determines which uniquely
identifying description ought to be associated with a name. Individual speakers could then
defer to the community. Such an amendment would take care of the arbitrariness objection
above, but would do nothing to address the plausible thought that the historical ties between
the Abrahamic faiths ensure shared reference.
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that instances of genuine cognitive contact with God are ubiquitous.26
While not all of these instances will involve actual name-giving that initiates reference, surely some will. Instead of one baptismal event, there are
many, some of them undoubtedly starting new communication chains. By
itself, this need not pose a serious problem. In everyday life, something
similar can happen. Sometimes, when you’re talking to someone about
someone else, you only find out after a while that the two of you are
actually referring to the same person, but under a different name or description. For general revelation, the idea would then be that people often
unknowingly refer to the same God under different names because they
are part of communication chains that started from instances of cognitive
contact with the same referent. In some cases, they might discover this,
whereas in others they don’t.27
A second issue generates more serious problems. The thesis of general
revelation entails that there is, and always has been, ubiquitous cognitive contact with God, some of which involves baptismal name-giving.
Hence, it is hardly plausible that reference to God started exclusively with
Abraham (although he may have started a communication chain that was
to become particularly influential). Bringing special revelation (thesis (D))
into the fold reinforces this. According to biblical testimony, God revealed
himself specially already in pre-Abrahamic times, e.g., to Adam and Eve
and later to Noah. So to the extent that pre-Abrahamic baptismal events
started communication chains that branched out into the world’s religions,
there is universally shared reference to God in all world religions. And
even if uses of “God” (or other words used to refer to God) in the world
religions do not trace back to some pre-Abrahamic baptismal event, they
may still trace back to different baptismal events of the same God in virtue
of general revelation, so that there is universal coreference after all. Hence,
together with the basic causal theory, the Reformed view indeed seems to
entail that all the world religions refer to the same God.
Perhaps some will welcome this as a happy consequence. The view that
all religions are somehow about the same ultimate reality is a popular
option.28 But regardless of whether there is good reason for its popularity,
the Reformed theologians whose views we have been espousing certainly
weren’t attempting to formulate a version of it. Theses (C), (E), (F), and (G)
make it clear that the Reformed view is more exclusivist: Only Christian
belief is now the appropriate response to God’s general and special rev26
Cf. also George Mavrodes, Revelation in Religious Belief (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1988) for a causal account of revelation.
27
This does raise the question of how people discover that they refer to the same God.
The causal theory itself is silent on this question, but presumably, it happens by comparing
descriptions that speakers hold to be true of the referent and finding out that there is sufficient commonality in them.
28
See Peter Byrne, Prolegomena to Religious Pluralism (London: MacMillan, 1995) and John
Hick, An Interpretation of Religion: Human Responses to the Transcendent, 2nd ed. (New Haven,
CT: Yale University Press, 2005) for elaborate discussion and defense.
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elation. Non-Christian worship is a form of idolatry. While these theses
do not address the issue of reference explicitly, they do suggest strongly
that the Reformed view doesn’t endorse the idea that the world religions
universally refer to (the same) God. To call a form of worship idolatry
is most plausibly interpreted as saying that it involves fictional or failed
reference. Here, then, the Reformed view and the basic causal theory do
not mesh very well.
We already argued that the basic causal theory is in need of amendments for independent reasons and discussed two specific additions. First,
reference requires that a speaker not be fundamentally mistaken about the
kind of thing she is referring to, and, secondly, uses of the name “X” with
which a speaker associates numerous beliefs that are false with respect to
X and that are all true about Y should count as reference to Y (provided
both “X” and “Y” in the speaker’s community both trace back appropriately to baptismal events that initiated reference to X and Y). We will now
go on to argue that the modified causal theory can deal with the problems
we just identified for the basic causal theory. Therefore, it is a much better
fit with the Reformed view.
Recall that the Inadequate Response Thesis (C) maintains that unaided
human responses to God’s general revelation are off the mark, sometimes
widely so. Instead of believing that He is an omnipotent, omniscient, and
omnibenevolent personal being, some people outside the Abrahamic
religions believe that God is an impersonal force, that there are many
all-too-human gods, that God is a figment of our unconscious desires, or
a byproduct of the evolution of human cognition. That is, some people
come to hold fundamentally mistaken beliefs about the very kind of being
God is in response to general revelation. Such beliefs, we proposed in our
discussion of the Satan/God example above, preclude reference. So a proponent of the Reformed view who accepts the modified causal theory of
reference is not committed to the view that any response whatsoever to
general revelation refers to God. To the extent that fundamentally mistaken beliefs have developed into religious belief systems or mythologies,
the proponent of the Reformed view should say that these beliefs involve
only fictional reference. They can grant that these religions and mythologies may have started out as responses to general revelation of the true
and only God, but will add that the truth is distorted and suppressed in
them to such an extent that they don’t refer to God anymore.
At the same time, the modified causal theory retains the advantage of
making reference primarily dependent on causal links between referent,
baptizer, and subsequent users of a name, rather than on the possession
of uniquely identifying descriptions. Reference is thus compatible with a
substantial amount of false beliefs about the referent (notwithstanding the
exceptions we argued for above). This is congenial to central ideas of the
Reformed view. Humans always respond to God’s general revelation (B),
so there is causal contact and hence reference, provided they do not form
fundamentally mistaken beliefs about what kind of being they are in contact
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with. Special revelation, too, involves genuine cognitive contact. But human
responses are inadequate (C), which is to say that they will involve many
or perhaps mostly false beliefs. On the modified causal view, however, this
will not make reference impossible. The modified causal view, then, can
do justice to both the universalistic and the exclusivist elements that are
present in the Reformed view.
These reflections do raise an important question, namely when mistaken beliefs are to count as so fundamentally mistaken that they invalidate
reference. Above, we suggested that beliefs that get the very ontological
category of a thing wrong should count as such, but when it comes to
God, it is not immediately clear which beliefs are guilty of such a mistake.
A thorough discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of the present
paper, but we suggest that at least the distinctions between personal and
non-personal beings, between concrete and abstract entities, between
universals and particulars, between substances, properties, stuffs, events,
processes, and modifications, and between creator and created are of
fundamental ontological importance. This is to say that views that place
God on the wrong side of these divides fail to refer to God. Of particular
urgency in relation to the question of coreference among the Abrahamic
faiths is the question whether the belief that God is not a Trinity should
count as a fundamental mistake that invalidates reference. We confess to
having torn intuitions here. On the one hand, whether or not God is a
Trinity strikes us as a matter of fundamental ontological category; on the
other, it doesn’t appear to be quite as fundamental as the distinction between, say, personal and non-personal or between creator and created.29
Clearly, an answer to the question whether Jews, Christians, and Muslims
refer to the same God depends on where you come down on this issue.
To sum up, the Reformed view and the modified causal theory of reference form fairly natural companions, whereas descriptivist theories of
reference and the basic causal theory all fly in the face of central elements
of the Reformed view. On the combination of the Reformed view and the
modified causal theory, adherents of all the Abrahamic religions arguably refer to the same God, in spite of their considerable differences of
opinion about his exact properties. And in so far as other religions have
also arisen from genuine cognitive contact with God that isn’t distorted
by fundamentally mistaken beliefs about what kind of being He is, they
too refer to the same God. Attempted reference to God/gods outside these
religions, however, through names such as “Zeus,” “Astarte,” “Vishnu,”
etc. is unsuccessful, as the alleged beings these names refer to fall into
a fundamentally different ontological category than God. They are, for
instance, not seen as creator and ultimate ground of everything that exists.
Hence, these are cases of fictional reference.
29
An anonymous referee helpfully pointed out that the kind of Trinitarian view one subscribes to might also matter here. It might be easier for Latin Trinitarians to defend the idea
that Jews and Muslims do not get the fundamental ontological category of God wrong than
it is for social Trinitarians.
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3.2 Worship and Belief
We have argued that proper worship of X presupposes belief in X. This
makes it possible to treat them jointly here. Belief in X, as we saw in section II, involves the beliefs (a) that X exists, (b) is a certain basic kind of
being, and (c) is trustworthy. And if worship of X is to be proper, (a) and (c)
must be true, while (b) must not be fundamentally mistaken. So to inquire
whether adherents of different religions believe in and worship the same
God, we first ask whether their beliefs of type (a) and (c) are true, and
whether their beliefs of type (b) are not fundamentally mistaken. We also
investigate what, if anything, the Reformed view entails on these issues.
In view of the previous section, the first thing to say is that people who,
according to the Reformed view, do not refer to God cannot be said to
believe in the same God as those who do refer to him. We found that, according to the Reformed view combined with the modified causal theory,
adherents of the non-Abrahamic world religions do not refer to God. This
entails that their beliefs of type (a), (b), and (c) are false, because they don’t
refer. They are cases of fictional reference—or of idolatry, as (G) has it. In
consequence, worship premised on such false beliefs is misguided.
With respect to the Abrahamic religions,30 the picture is more complicated. Belief in God requires more than mere reference, so the fact that the
Reformed view can be taken to imply that users of “God” in these religions
all refer to the same God doesn’t automatically mean that Jews, Christians
and Muslims all believe in the same God. If they are to believe in the same
God, their beliefs of sort (a), (b), and (c) must be roughly the same and also
correct. According to the Reformed view, beliefs of sort (a) and (c) as endorsed by Jews and Muslims are true.31 But what about (b)? Are adherents
of the Abrahamic religions committed to holding the same characterization
of God’s basic nature as true? Clearly, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam are
centered around different characterizations of God. Although they share
various beliefs about God’s basic nature, they also differ sharply on points
that are considered to be non-negotiable by orthodox adherents of the three
religions.32 In view of this, we can try to make progress by distinguishing
between those elements that belong essentially to God’s basic nature and
those that don’t (i.e., that are either non-basic or not essential) according to
these three religions. We are strongly inclined to think that, as long as we
do this while honoring the beliefs of broadly orthodox adherents of these
religions, we end up with characterizations that are incompatible in their
essential elements. For no characterization of God that leaves out, say, the
doctrine of the Trinity or the unique role of Christ will be acceptable to
30
For the sake of brevity, we omit the qualification that there may be non-Abrahamic
religions which do refer to God and will speak as if only the Abrahamic religions do so.
31
At least with regard to the minimal belief that God can be trusted. They will differ in
their beliefs about what God can be trusted to do.
32
We ignore any intra-religious differences among broadly orthodox believers for the sake
of convenience. Adding them, too, would further complicate the story but not detract from
the main point we’re making.
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orthodox Christians. At the same time, those very characterizations will
be unacceptable to adherents of both Judaism and Islam. At most, then,
we can expect agreement on a subset of the essential characterizations of
God’s basic nature in the Abrahamic religions.33
The conclusion we draw from this is that the question whether Jews,
Christians, and Muslims believe in and worship the same God doesn’t
allow for a firm univocal answer. On the one hand, since belief in the same
God requires commitment to the same characterization of God’s basic nature, they do not believe in the same God and hence do not worship the
same God. This is in line with the Reformed view’s claim that only the
Christian response to God’s revelation is now appropriate. On the other
hand, as we argued in the previous section, the Reformed view can be
taken to entail that the word “God” as used in these three religions refers to the same God and, differences notwithstanding, there is certainly
striking partial overlap in their characterizations of God’s nature. For
these reasons, it would be misleading to just leave it at an unqualified
negative answer.
We can make sense of this conclusion as follows. It follows from the Reformed view that, strictly speaking, adherents of the Abrahamic religions
do not believe in and worship the same God. Of course, however, ordinary
speech isn’t always strict, which is why we sometimes do say that adherents of the Abrahamic religions believe in and worship the same God.
The Reformed view can grant that there is some justification for doing so,
by acknowledging that it can be argued that they refer to the same God
and that they share several important beliefs about God’s basic nature.
This move would still testify to the conclusion that there is no firm univocal answer to the question whether adherents of Judaism, Christians,
and Muslims believe in and worship the same God. The Reformed view
articulates this very predicament well.
4. Conclusion
We have presented a Reformed view on the relation between Christianity
and other religions, which finds its inspiration in the Dutch Kuyperian
tradition. Next, we analyzed what it is to worship, believe in, and refer to
God and looked at how these concepts are interrelated. We argued that
worship of X requires belief in X, which at least involves having the beliefs
(a) that X exists, (b) is a certain kind of thing, and (c) that X can be trusted
or relied upon in those ways that are relevant to things of X’s kind. If beliefs (a), (b), or (c) are false, belief in X and hence worship of X is improper.
Belief in X also involves (attempted) reference to X, which fails if X doesn’t
exist. False beliefs about X, however, do not necessarily invalidate reference, at least if we construe reference along the lines of a causal theory of
33
But see Vincent Brümmer, Atonement, Christology and the Trinity: Making Sense of the
Christian Doctrine (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), for an attempt to identify a common core doctrinal structure in the Abrahamic faiths.
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reference. Fundamentally mistaken beliefs, i.e., false beliefs about the very
kind of thing that X is, do undermine reference.
We went on to argue that the Reformed view meshes well with a modified causal theory of reference. On this combination of views, there is a
case to be made that adherents of the Abrahamic faiths refer to the same
God, although this does depend on the assumption that disbelief in God’s
Trinitarian nature is not a reference-undermining fundamental mistake.
Adherents of many non-Abrahamic religions do not refer to the same
God, since they have fundamentally mistaken beliefs about the kind of
being God is. The Reformed view further implies that, in a strict sense,
Jews, Christians, and Muslims do not believe in and worship the same
God. Nonetheless, we may be forgiven for sometimes speaking loosely
and saying that they do believe in and worship the same God, because,
arguably, they do corefer to God and their conceptions of what kind of
being God is overlap to a considerable and important extent.34
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